Abstract:
Based
on a case study of Saudi Arabia’s WTO accession, the article
offers
a critique of conventional factor- and sector-based models of trade
policy,
proposing instead a two-level institutional account that is likely
to be relevant
for non-democratic states in general. Historically grown patterns
of institutional fragmentation in both public and private sector
in Saudi
Arabia
have made interest formation and the building of policy coalitions
difficult.
Various WTO-related economic reforms have therefore been held up
as long
as they were negotiated within the disjointed Saudi system. However,
as soon
as the Saudi leadership decided to directly follow the reform demands
of its
international negotiation partners, changes were rammed through rapidly –
as institutional fragmentation of interests prevented an encompassing
veto
coalition against a comprehensive policy package which was in its substance
imposed from outside. Fragmentation of state, business and relations
between
them can hence mean policy stalemate, but can also make for rapid
policy adjustment under conditions of external pressure. In its conclusion,
the article relates these findings to the institutionalist literature
on trade in
general.
