Abstract:
In
this paper we present the peer co-ordination approach which we
apply to EU intergovernmental negotiations. This approach seeks to
contribute
to liberal intergovernmentalist' bargaining theory (Moravcsik 1993,
1998). It assumes that EU intergovernmental negotiations should
be conceptualized as a rational learning process under uncertainty
in
which governments co-ordinate with peers in intergovernmental policy
networks. In particular, we investigate the reasons why an EU government
should select another government as a peer. Relying on a dataset
on the EU Intergovernmental Conference of 1996 which led to the
Amsterdam Treaty, we test five alternative hypotheses on peer selection
(ex
ante transnational co-ordination, preference, salience, power,
and neighbourship; H1-H5). A random model provides us with a null
model
(H0) against which to test alternative models. We find that peer
selection during these EU intergovernmental negotiations can best
be explained by ex ante transnational co-ordination networks.
Keywords:
Bargaining theory; EU; intergovernmental negotiations; peer co-ordination;
policy networks
