PUBLICATIONS

Growing Power Meets Frustration in the Doha Round's First Four Years," in Developing Countries and Global Trade Negotiations, ed. Larry Crump and Javed Maswood (Routledge, forthcoming 2007)

Negotiating Trade: Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA. 2006. Cambridge University Press.

Chairing a WTO Negotiation. June 2005. In Journal of International Economic Law 8(2): 425-448, and in Reforming the World Trading System: Legitimacy, Efficiency and Democratic Governance, edited by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and James Harrison (Oxford University Press).

Escenarios para Cancun. Proceso, (September), 2003. Proceso.com.mx

La OMC, otra vez en punto muerto [The WTO, deadlocked again], Foreign Affairs en Español 3, (Julio-Septiembre):111-118, 2003.

Creating Data on International Negotiation Strategies, Alternatives, and Outcomes, International Negotiation 7:39-52, 2002.

Bounded Rationality and the World Political Economy: The Nature of Decision Making. In Governing the World's Money, edited by David M. Andrews, C. Randall Henning, and Louis W. Pauly Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 2002.

The world political economy is driven by bounded rationality, yet many economists and political scientists still sidestep this forty-year-old idea. Accumulating evidence shows the costs of this neglect, even granting that other perspectives have been productive. Greater investment in research premised on individual bounded rationality would improve our knowledge empirically, theoretically, and practically, as a minority in each discipline is showing. Greater attention to how economic policy decisions are actually made would improve our theories' empirical validity. A new constructivism rebuilt upon a bounded rationality microfoundation would be more complete theoretically and better able to account for cultural change. Taking a fresh look at classical rational choice and constructivism from this perspective might dissolve the adversarial debate between them. Sounder knowledge of real decision making would also make our theory more useful in the real world. Rich opportunities await young and other scholars interested in breaking new ground.

Case Study Methods in International Political Economy. In International Studies Perspectives 2:161-176, 2001. Revised version published as Case Study Methods in International Political Economy. 2004. In Cases, Numbers, Models: International Relations Research Methods. Edited by D. Sprinz and Y. Wolinsky. University of Michigan Press.

IPE scholars frequently use qualitative methods to contribute to theory building, but we could get greater value from them. Single case studies are actually a family of research designs: the disciplined interpretive case study, the hypothesis generating case study, the least-likely, most-likely and deviant case studies. The method of difference employs comparison and attempts to eliminate rival interpretation by choosing two or more cases that match in important respects. These methods enjoy several inherent advantages relative to statistical methods, and they suffer from several disadvantages. Neither family of methods is sufficient. The two complement one another and ultimately must be combined.

International Trade Policies: Gains from Exchange between Economics and Political Science, edited with Thomas D. Willett. University of Michigan Press, 1990. Chapter 1, Gains from Exchange: An Introduction. Chapter 11, Future Directions in the Political Economy of Trade Policies.

Understanding International Trade Policies: An Emerging Synthesis, World Politics 43 (October): 139-167, 1990. In Trade and Investment Policy, edited by Thomas Brewer and Edward Elgar, 1998. (pdf)

The international trade problems of the 1980s stimulated an expansion of scholarship on trade policies by economists and political scientists. At least four distinct theoretical perspectives weave their way through recent literature that concentrates on the United States--emphasizing market conditions, policy beliefs and values, national political institutions, and global structures, respectively. New studies in each of these traditions advance beyond the work of their predecessors, but none of the perspectives has yet proved adequate as a single unifying vehicle. Nevertheless, we can also see clear movement toward a synthesis, with single works blending insights from several traditions. Thus, the books under review do not all fall neatly into the familiar exclusive catagories of "economics" or "political science." The emerging synthesis needs strengthening in several ways, including the development of "conditioning hypotheses" that will reduce remaining apparent confusions.

The barriers that kept developing countries on the sidelines during multilateral trade negotiations of the 1960s and 1970s have diminished. During the Uruguay round, four types of developing country negotiating approaches could emerge--bilateral or minilateral approaches as alternatives to GATT rounds; coalitions spanning North as well as South; a loose NIC-led Southern coalition; revival of a global Southern bloc. Each faces obstacles. The third seems the most promising.

The Outcomes of International Trade Conflicts: The U.S. and South Korea, 1960-1981. International Studies Quarterly 29 (September): 263-286, 1985. (pdf)

Since 1960 national governments have increasingly found themselves in international trade disputes. Yet little research has attempted to analyze this important form of conflict conparatively. Here four general hypotheses are proposed for explaining variations in bilateral conflict outcomes, and a technique for comparing outcomes is devised. A study of one bilateral North-South Relationship, that of South Korea and the US, shows that 13 significant commercial disputes occurred between 1960 and 1981, spanning three industrial sectors. The outcomes varied in the degree to which each government achieved its initial objectives. The pattern of variations is explained by the interstate power structure, the domestic distribution of power among industries in the US, the international bargaining process, and to some extent by sectoral market conditions. Conclusions are based on interviews conducted in Seoul, Hong Kong and Washington, as well as on other data.

Latin American Trade Negotiations with the United States. International Organization 34 (Spring): 207-228, 1980. Published in Spanish by Cuadernos Semestrales (Mexico), 1980. (pdf)

The traditional Structure of North-South economic relations, with the richer countries exporting manufactures and the poorer ones exporting primary products, has been changing. As comparative advantage shifts from North to South, as manufactured exports from the South and protectionism in the North expand, one political consequence has been bilateral trade conflicts between governments. In twnty-five such conflicts with Latin American states, the United States, despite its international power advantage, has not achieved its fullest objectives in every case. The pattern of outcomes corresponds most closely to the expectations of an "unorthodox dependency" perspective. The United States is successful more often than Latin American governments, but the latter improved their outcomes in some cases by pursuing one or more of three possible strategies: mobilizing allies within the United States, threatening retaliation, or technocratic argument. The notion of a technocratic strategy may have applications on other issues.

The U.S. and the Emergence of Flexible Exchange Rates: An Analysis of Foreign Policy Change. In International Organization 33 (Winter): 57-82, 1979. Earlier version published in German by Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 1977.

United States international monetary policy changed twice in the early 1970s--first with the 1971 New Economic Policy and again with a second devaluation in February 1973. These shifts helped bring about the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime of fixed exchange rates. Though these changes were most of all responses to the persistent U.S. deficit and other changes in the international financial situation, policy beliefs of senior officials were also critical in influencing the timing of change and the choice of new policy content. President Nixon's and Secretary Connally's domestic political expectations accounted for some parts of the 1971 package. International military-political considerations shaped the partial settlement of December 1971 but had only distant influence earlier or later. Organizational factors were of relatively little importance in determining monetary policies. The policy-making process tends to be tightly closed and centralized during major changes. "Stands" do not necessarily reflect organizational aims, and interest groups do not necessarily act in their own supposed interest. Transnational actors are an important element of the financial situation. The analysis of these changes can be integrated with approaches used to analyze other foreign policies.