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Kripke
on
Presupposition and Anaphora

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The publication of Kripke (2009), originally delivered as a lecture at Princeton University in 1990, was long in coming. Widely circulated since then, some aspects of the original manuscript are now well known by many working on presupposition. The published paper differs from the manuscript in clarifying certain points, tying up loose ends, answering some previously open questions, and incorporating a modest revision or two. That would be reason enough to review it here. More important is an assessment of what is truly groundbreaking in the discussion, and what is not. It is not, I will argue, Kripke's attempted demonstrations that propositions previously said to be presupposed by various utterance types really aren't presupposed, though there is something correct about those critical remarks. Nor is it his identification of new propositions presupposed by the utterances in question. Although there are new presuppositions, in certain cases his characterization of them requires revision or supplementation. However, these are not the most important aspects of his paper. Rather, I will argue, his most significant insights concern the mechanisms that give rise to presuppositions, which involve the formulation of presuppositional requirements of a kind different from those of the theories on which he comments. These in turn have far-reaching consequences for the notion of conversational contexts incorporating shared background information that utterances are used to update, and against which they are evaluated. Ironically, it is these, most important, aspects of Kripke's view that (to my knowledge) have been least understood, and most incompletely assimilated into ongoing work. For this reason, I will concentrate on them.

Kripke doesn't offer either a new foundational theory of what presupposition is, or an all-encompassing descriptive theory identifying presupposition triggers, and computing the presuppositions of complex sentences from their semantics and the presuppositions of their constituent clauses. On the foundational front, he works within the basic pragmatic

framework of Stalnaker (1973, 1974), elaborated in Soames (1982, 1989). The idea, roughly put, is (i) that a member *m* of conversation presupposes a proposition *p* at a time *t* iff at *t*, *m* takes *p* for granted, and assumes that the others in the conversation do too, or would be willing to do so, without objection, if the issue arose, (ii) that an utterance *U* presupposes *p* (at *t*) iff one can reasonably infer from *U* that the speaker presupposes *p* at *t*, and (iii) that a sentence *S* *pragmatically presupposes* *p* iff normal, literal utterances of *S* presuppose *p*. Defining the *conversational context C* at *t* to be the set of propositions jointly believed or assumed by the conversational participants at *t* (and to be so recognized), we may put this by saying that *S* pragmatically presupposes *p* iff normal, literal utterances of *S* are reasonably taken to indicate that the speaker regards *p* either to be a member of *C* already, or to be a proposition the audience is willing, without objection, to add to *C* in evaluating the utterance. Still more simply, we may say that *S* pragmatically presupposes *P* iff normal utterances of *S* in a context *C* *require* *p* to be a member of *C* – adding that that when the requirement isn't met, the expected response is for the hearers to *accommodate* the speaker by adding *p*.¹

Although Kripke regards this characterization as accurate enough for his purposes, he also suspects it may not cover all cases – such as that of the belligerent monarchist who avers “No matter what you republicans say, I met the king of France last week,” fully recognizing that his anti-republican presupposition, that France has a king, is controversial. I agree with Kripke that this sort of example puts strain on the model, without undermining it. The lesson I draw is that real conversational contexts are more complex than standard idealizations of them. In the natural scenario for the monarch's remark, what makes his presupposition genuine, despite being deliberately controversial, is that the information that *he believes* it,

¹ Accommodation is familiar from Lewis (1979) and Heim (1983). The type alluded to above is called “*de facto* accommodation” and distinguished from “*de jure* accommodation” (often called “cancellation”) in Soames (1989), pp. 100-101 in the Soames (2009) reprinting.

while the others *disagree*, is already in the context -- which includes a record not just of jointly accepted propositions, but also of those in dispute, and of the positions taken by the protagonists. In such a case, the remark doesn't violate constraints on presupposition because what it presupposes doesn't change the conversational score on these points. Other, related scenarios can, I suspect, be treated as variations on this one. Although a fuller theory of what presuppositions and contexts are would make this precise, I will follow Kripke in putting these complications aside.

On the descriptive front, Kripke offers an account of presuppositions that combines the Karttunen-Peters (1979) inheritance conditions for negations, conjunctions, disjunctions, and indicative conditionals with a theory of certain presupposition triggers – including ‘too’, ‘either’, ‘again’, and ‘other’ -- that he takes to be “anaphoric” in an extended sense.² Some additional presupposition-triggers are treated as bearing similarities to the standard cases. In the standard anaphoric case, a presupposition trigger requires the presence of an identifiable piece of information in what Kripke calls “the active context,” which contains information on which speaker-hearers are actively focused. The required information is best thought of as a structured proposition parallel to the proposition expressed by the clause S containing the trigger. The presuppositions of S are those that result from (a) identifying the parallel proposition and one of its constituents to play the role of “the antecedent” of a corresponding constituent, “the anaphor,” of the proposition expressed by S, and (b) requiring a certain relation to hold between the two. Different presupposition triggers may be associated with different constraints on what propositions count as parallel, on what may be antecedent of what, and on what relations are presupposed to hold between “antecedent” and “anaphor”.

² See also Karttunen (1973, 1974) and Soames (1979), reprinted in Soames (2009).

Although Kripke's theory is limited in scope, and needs correction or supplementation on a few points, it is also rich in insights, with broad implications for the nature of conversational contexts, and their role in semantic and pragmatic theories. The contexts required by the approach are more complex than sets of possible world-states, or even sets of sets of such. As we shall see, they must contain a set of structured propositions, more likely a pair of such sets, plus further indications of conversational questions and topics.

Informal Overview

Kripke's main example of an anaphoric presupposition trigger is 'too'.

1. If Herb comes, then *the boss* will come too. (focus on 'the boss')

The standard theory in the late seventies and early eighties maintained (i) that the presupposition of the consequent of (1) is that someone other than the boss will come, and (ii) that presupposition of (1) itself is the material conditional (1P)

1P. Herb comes \supset someone other than the boss will come.

Why would a speaker *s* presuppose this? Not because *s* thinks Herb won't come. If *s* were assuming that, *s* wouldn't have uttered a sentence with an antecedent assumed to be false. Possibly, *s* presupposes (1P) because *s* is both independently sure that someone other than the boss will come, and confident either that the audience is too, or that they are willing to treat it as uncontroversial. More likely, however, *s* presupposes that Herb's coming would provide solid grounds for thinking that someone other than the boss will come, by virtue of the fact that Herb isn't the boss. If *s* is reasoning in this way, then *s* is presupposing that Herb isn't the boss. That, more or less, was the standard explanation. Kripke's first point was that the explanation was wrong, even though it approximates the right result in some cases.

For Kripke, its incorrectness is shown by (2), utterances of which presuppose that neither Herb nor his wife is the boss.

2. If Herb and his wife both come, then *the boss* will come too.

The presupposition assigned to (2) by the then standard account was (2P).

2P. Herb and his wife both come \supset someone other than the boss will come

Since (2) is trivially satisfied by the mere fact that the boss is one person, while Herb and his wife are two, the standard account failed to identify any substantive presupposition. Kripke's counter-suggestion is that an utterance of a sentence or clause containing 'too' anaphorically depends on parallel information present in the discourse. In (2), the referent of the focused expression is presupposed to be distinct from Herb and his wife, mentioned in the antecedent.

This, or something like it, is surely right.

Kripke's discussion includes several refinements of this idea.

(i) The presuppositions triggered by 'too' are carried by the clause in which it occurs, e.g. by the consequent of (2), rather than by (2) itself. Kripke takes this to be shown by (3).

3. If Nancy doesn't win and the winner comes to the party, then *Nancy* will come too.

The presupposition associated with 'too' is that Nancy won't be the winner. This isn't attached to the conditional, Kripke reasons, since one who utters it doesn't presuppose that Nancy won't win. Instead, it is attached to the consequent, so (3) carries the trivial presupposition: *Nancy doesn't win and the winner comes to the party* \supset *Nancy isn't the winner*.

(ii) The presupposition triggered by 'too' doesn't always involve identity. Consider (4).

4. The Republicans supported the bill, and *Senator Blank* supported it too.

The expression 'the Republicans' in the first conjunct corresponding to the focused term in the second isn't a singular term, so the presupposition – that Senator Blank isn't a Republican -- involves non-inclusion (in the set of Republicans), rather than nonidentity.

(iii) The focused expression doesn't have to be a singular term.

5. John finished his work, and he *wrote an essay* too.

This presupposes that writing an essay wasn't part of John's work.

(iv) In addition to presuppositions of nonidentity, or non-inclusion, 'too' also gives rise to presuppositions of identity, or inclusion.

6. The Midwesterners are coming for drinks, and the Nebraskans are *having dinner with us* too.

The *non-inclusion* presupposition generated by ‘too’ is that coming for drinks is one thing, having dinner with us is another. This presupposition is generated by taking the antecedent to be parallel to the consequent. That parallel doesn’t require the Midwesterners to be the same as the Nebraskans; it is sufficient that the latter be *included* in the former, which is presupposed. Thus, the utterance carries the information that a subset of those coming for drinks is having dinner with us. Similar reasoning explains the *identity* presupposition, carried by an utterance of (7), that Jim is the chairman of the linguistics department.

7. The chairman of the linguistics department is coming for drinks, and Jim will *have dinner with us* too.

As these examples indicate, the range of the different presuppositions induced by ‘too’ is striking. Depending on the context and linguistic environment, clauses containing ‘too’ may carry presuppositions of inclusion or non-inclusion, as well as identity or nonidentity. What unites these cases? What is the fundamental presuppositional requirement associated with ‘too’ that generates different presuppositions in different cases? Although Kripke doesn’t fully and explicitly answer this question, the general shape of his answer is pretty clear. The fundamental presuppositional requirement associated with ‘too’ has three components: (i) there must be one or more propositions $q_1 \dots q_n$ on which speaker-hearers are actively focused that *parallel* the proposition p expressed by the clause containing ‘too’, (ii) the focused constituent of p (“the anaphor”) must differ from the corresponding constituents of the q s (“the antecedents”), and (iii) because of this difference, p *adds* to the information provided by the q s in a way that goes beyond the fact that p isn’t entailed by the q s (plus, perhaps, subsidiary propositions in the conversational background). Although Kripke doesn’t specify precisely how p must add information, his examples are ones in which both p and (a parallel) q characterize things as being so-and-so, and the class of things so characterized by p and q together *extends* the class so characterized by q alone.³ Though the conditions required for one proposition to *parallel* another also remain to be spelled out, the paradigm case is one in

³ Kripke says, “The simple suggestion is that in general, if I say so-and-so and so-and-so are coming, and he’s coming too, the presupposition is that ‘he’ *is an extra person*.” (372, my emphasis)

which the main, and perhaps only, difference between p and q is the difference between “the anaphor” in p and “the antecedent(s)” in q. These – plus restrictions on where one may look to find the qs -- are what generate the presuppositions indicated above, and what call for more detailed specification.⁴

Even without this, the analysis motivates changes in the structure of accounts of presuppositions as constraints on the incrementation of contexts. On such accounts, presuppositions are requirements placed by utterances on contextually shared background assumptions. When S presupposes p, the basic rule is: *Don't utter S unless p is already assumed* – subject to the constraint that apparent violations of the rule are tolerated when hearers *accommodate* the speaker by adding p to the assumed propositions.⁵ With this in mind, consider an utterance of (8) in a context in which there is no preceding clause, or sentence in the discourse, on which the ‘too’-clause might anaphorically depend.

8. ? *Gil* is having dinner in Princeton tonight too.

On the pre-Kripke analysis, the utterance presupposes that someone other than Gil is having dinner in Princeton tonight. Since it is obvious that many people are doing so, the hearers should be happy to accommodate the speaker by adding this obvious truth to the background, making the utterance unproblematic – which it's not. Kripke's analysis explains why.

⁴ “The general idea is that the presupposition arises from the anaphoric requirement that when one says ‘too’, one refers to some parallel information that is either in another clause (that's the interesting case for the projection problem) or in the [active] context. ... When the focused element is a singular term, it is presupposed to be non-coreferential with the other corresponding elements in the parallel clauses or other bits of information in the (active) context. Since what we have is a species of anaphora, what we need is a theory, parallel to that for pronominal anaphora, of what types of anaphora are permitted, and of how these new types of presuppositional anaphora are related to other, more familiar types of anaphora, including ordinary anaphoric pronouns.” (372-373) Kripke does not, as I do, use the terms ‘anaphor’ and ‘antecedent’ in discussing the cases -- though it is clear that the anaphoric requirement he speaks of involves the focused term (what I call ‘the anaphor’) and a corresponding element (that I call ‘the antecedent’) in another clause, or in the active context.

⁵For example, the response to a man who says to someone who doesn't know he is married, “I may have to pick up my wife later,” is usually to accommodate him by adding the presupposition that he is married to the context, thereby bringing the use of the presupposition-generating term ‘my wife’ into harmony with the presuppositional rule.

Because ‘too’ is “anaphoric,” the utterance requires antecedent information identifying someone else, or some other people, as having dinner in Princeton on the night in question, which is lacking in this case. Since hearers have no way of knowing who the speaker has in mind, this requirement typically can’t be accommodated.⁶

However, as Kripke recognizes, the utterance doesn’t require a preceding *discourse* with any *linguistic material* paralleling the sentence uttered.⁷ To see this, imagine a use of (9), by someone listening to a boring lecture, after someone else – Y-- has conspicuously yawned.

9. I’m bored too.

Here, the presuppositional requirement is satisfied by the fact that Y’s yawn has prompted conversational participants to draw the conclusion that Y is bored. This suggests that the antecedent information required by ‘too’ is a *structured proposition*, actively focused on by conversational participants, parallel to the one expressed by the sentence or clause containing ‘too’. When such a proposition is absent, it typically can’t be supplied by accommodation, in which case utterances of sentences like (8) or (9) will be irredeemably bad. When such a proposition is present – either because some event leads everyone to focus on it, or because it is expressed by a preceding clause or sentence in the discourse -- the utterance typically carries presuppositions of roughly the sort Kripke identifies. *These presuppositions* – that one individual isn’t identical with another, that one person isn’t a member of a certain group, that doing one thing doesn’t involve doing another, etc. -- often *can* be accommodated. Imagine, for example, an utterance of (10), whispered during the Dean’s lecture, after observing Y yawning, in the next row.

10. If our new Assistant Professor were here, *he* would be bored too.

⁶ See Soames (1989), at p. 126 of the Soames (2009) reprinting.

⁷ 374-375 of Kripke (2009).

Here, the parallel information required by ‘too’ is *that Y is bored*, and the presupposition is *that Y isn’t our new Assistant Professor* – which the hearer might be willing to grant as uncontroversial, even if he hadn’t previously been aware of its truth.⁸

This suggests that theories of presupposition require, not one, but at least two, context sets. One of these, which Kripke calls *the active context*, is (or includes) a set of structured propositions on which speaker-hearers are actively focused. It provides “anaphoric antecedents” for propositional constituents expressed by focused elements of clauses containing ‘too’, or other anaphoric presupposition triggers. The other set, which Kripke calls *the passive context*, includes propositions already assumed or established. Once the antecedents of presuppositional anaphors have been located, and the presupposed propositions generated from them, the resulting presuppositional requirements can be satisfied by the passive context, which may be augmented by accommodation in cases in which it does not already do so. This feature of the approach contrasts with other accounts, which typically posit a single context-set, sometimes identified with an unstructured set of possible worlds, and sometimes with a set of propositions. A central lesson of Kripke’s analysis is that genuine conversational contexts require more structure than that.⁹

Kripke extends the analysis to other anaphoric presupposition triggers, e.g., ‘again’.

- 11a. Gil is eating dinner again!
- b. If USC defeats OSU in September, then the Trojans will probably defeat them again the Rose Bowl.

⁸ Note also that here “the antecedent” corresponding to “the ‘too’-anaphor” is the person Y, even though the linguistic antecedent of the anaphoric occurrence of the pronoun ‘he’ in (9), which is the focused element in the ‘too’-clause, is ‘our new Assistant Professor’. This illustrates how Kripke’s special notion of anaphora differs from at least one standard linguistic notion of anaphora.

⁹ “Heim (1983), I believe, rolls the whole context into one grand proposition that is a set of possible worlds. On my account, it seems likely that not only will there have to be two contexts, the active and the passive, but also the nature of the active context, at least, will have to be more complicated than simply a set of worlds. First, the active context will be a set containing propositions, which might better be thought of as structured. Moreover, the set might be divided into questions and topics as well as assertions and so on.” (375)

(11a) is like (8). If one utters it out of the blue, with no antecedent information in the active context that parallels the proposition expressed by (11a) (in this case by identifying Gil as eating dinner), the utterance will be deviant – despite the fact that we all know that Gil has eaten dinner before. However, if we saw him earlier in the evening eating in a restaurant, and later see him eating somewhere else, an utterance of (11a) should be fine – the presupposition being that the first meal was eaten before the second (which is obviously satisfied). In the case of (11b), the presence of ‘again’ in the consequent clause requires a piece of information parallel to the proposition expressed by the consequent that identifies the Trojans as defeating OSU. The proposition expressed by the antecedent will play this role, if it is presumed that USC and the Trojans are identical, in which case this proposition, plus the proposition that the Rose Bowl game occurs after the game in September, will be assigned as presuppositions of the consequent. The conditional as a whole will then presuppose: *USC defeats OSU in September* \supset (*USC and the Trojans are identical and the Rose Bowl game occurs after the game in September*). Since the speaker’s reason for taking this for granted can be presumed to be that s takes its consequent for granted, that is what the utterance presupposes. Thus, Kripke’s analysis of ‘again’ parallels his analysis of ‘too’.

The presupposition-generating adverb ‘stop’ is treated as being partially similar to ‘again’ and ‘too’, and partially different.

12a. Sam has stopped beating his dog.

b. If Sam watches the opera, he will stop watching it when the game comes on.

Unlike the other examples, utterances of (12a) *don’t require* the active context to contain a proposition parallel to the one expressed by the clause containing the presupposition trigger – in this case, a proposition that represents Sam as beating his dog. It is enough if Sam is assumed to have done so before, typically up until some time in the recent past. This

presuppositional requirement, that Sam has beaten his dog, is placed on the passive context, without arising from presuppositional anaphora. By contrast, the consequent of (12b) is taken to be anaphorically dependent on the antecedent for a time at which the event it describes is to occur. Here, the presupposition is that the game comes on after the opera begins.

Kripke discusses clefts in a similar framework.

- 13a. It was John who opposed the decision.
- b. It was John and Mary who opposed the decision.
- c. * If John opposed the decision, then it was Mary who opposed the decision.
- d. If the author of *Principia Mathematica* won the prize, then it was Bertrand Russell who won the prize.

Prior to Kripke, [It was A who Ved] was typically said to presuppose the proposition expressed by [Someone Ved]. It does not presuppose the proposition expressed by [One and only one individual Ved], since that would rule out (13b), utterances of which are fine. Still, the old account wasn't right. If it were, Kripke suggests, then the presupposition carried by an utterance of (13c) would be the trivial truth that if John opposed the decision, then someone did – in which case the utterance should be unproblematic, which it isn't.

The crucial point, for Kripke, is that although an utterance of (13a) would normally occur in a context in which it is assumed that the decision was opposed, what it fundamentally presupposes is that it answers the question “Who opposed the decision?” -- which is presumed to be a focus of the conversation at the time. When this question is not on the table, an utterance of (13a), out of the blue, is apt to seem strained or puzzling, though in some cases there may be an accommodation-induced *pretense* that it has already been introduced.¹⁰ But no matter how the question is put before speaker-hearers, the utterance's dependence on it is

¹⁰ See the characterization in Soames (1989), reprinted in Soames (2009) pp. 127-128. Kripke agrees, noting that the accommodation-induced pretense may be rather common, and amount to a rhetorical trope in certain kinds of writing.

what is presuppositionally required. An utterance of [It was A who Ved] is understood as an attempt provide a *complete* answer to the question expressed by [Who Ved?], on which speaker-hearers are focused. On this analysis, (13c) is deviant because the consequent clause *won't* -- given both the antecedent and the presumption that John isn't Mary -- provide a such an answer. Here, the dependence of the cleft sentence on the question generates a speaker presupposition that John is Mary, the presumed falsity of which is responsible for the deviance of (13c). When the anaphorically generated identity presupposition is known to be true, as in (13d), the utterance is fine.

'Either', 'Or', and Structured Propositions

One of my themes has been that the conception of anaphoric dependence inherent in Kripke's theory of presupposition requires structured propositions. This is illustrated by utterances of the 'too'-sentences (9) and (10), which anaphorically depend on structured information present in a context in which there is *no discourse*. The case for structured propositions is strengthened by examples in which there is more to the discourse than the sentence or clause S containing the presupposition trigger, but the information on which S anaphorically depends cannot be identified with the semantic contents of any of the sentences or clauses that are present. Examples of this sort can be constructed using 'either', which is like 'too', except for requiring a negative element.

14a. *Sam* isn't having dinner in New York tonight either.

- b. If Kasparov doesn't defeat Karpov in the next game, he won't defeat him *in the Berlin game* either.

Utterances of (14a) depend on parallel information in the active context identifying one or more individuals as *not* having dinner in New York tonight -- the presupposition being that the focused element, Sam, is distinct from those individuals. In (14b), the consequent requires information identifying an occasion on which Kasparov doesn't defeat Karpov, which is provided by the

proposition expressed by the antecedent. The presupposition is that the Berlin game isn't the next game.

With this in mind, consider (15).

15. Either the assistant is guilty, or *the boss* isn't guilty either.

Like the consequent of (14b), the right disjunct of (15) requires information parallel to that which it expresses, but for the contribution of the focused element. Unlike that antecedent of (14b), the information expressed by the left disjunct of (15) doesn't satisfy this condition. Nevertheless, an utterance of (15) may be fine, even if no other piece of information expressed by a sentence in the discourse does either. The reason for this involves how we think about disjunction. One who assertively utters (15) is committed to ruling out all scenarios except those in which the assistant isn't guilty but the boss is. Since this will be apparent to speaker-hearers, one of the propositions on which they will be actively focused in understanding the utterance is the proposition *that the assistant isn't guilty*. This is the parallel information on which the right disjunct depends, the presupposition being that the assistant \neq the boss. The example underscores the point that the anaphoric dependence required by Kripke's account of presuppositional anaphora is defined in terms of structured contents – propositions – rather than sentences present in the discourse. Essentially the same argument can be made with 'too', using (16).

16. Either the assistant isn't guilty, or *the boss* is guilty too.

Clefts Revisited: Negation, Presupposition Inheritance, and Cancellation

Presuppositions are standardly preserved under negation. So, if, as Kripke assumes, cleft sentences bear presuppositions, their presuppositions should be similarly preserved. What, then, are the presuppositions common to utterances of (17a) and (17b)?

- 17a. It was A who Ved.
b. It wasn't A who Ved.

The answer, it would seem, is that both presuppose (17c), perhaps among other things.

17c. Someone Ved.

But isn't that the bad old theory that Kripke refuted? Yes and no. Yes, that theory maintained that (17a) and (17b) presuppose (17c). However, Kripke's critique doesn't show *this claim* to be incorrect. What it shows is (i) that is that there is *more* to the presuppositional requirements of (17a) and (17b) than the fact that they presuppose (17c), and (ii) that the fact that they do is a byproduct of the fundamental presuppositional requirement that utterances of (17a) and (17b) are understood as answers to the question (17d), on which speaker-hearers are actively focused.

17d. Who Ved?

Since this question itself presupposes (17c), utterances of (17a) and (17b) do too.¹¹

Kripke further maintains that an utterance of (17a) is understood as a *complete* answer to the question — which is responsible for the deviance of (13c), and the acceptability of (13d). But whatever the ultimate status of the completeness condition, it is not clear that it should be included among the presuppositions of utterances of cleft sentences. For although an utterance of (17a) is understood as providing a *complete* answer to (17d), an utterance of its negation, (17b), clearly isn't. If presuppositions are preserved under negation, this shows that the completeness condition on the answer to (17d) provided by an utterance of (17a) is not itself a presupposition.¹² Thus, we are left with the view that the presuppositions of (17a) and (17b) are (a) that utterances of them are understood as responses to the question (17d) on which speaker-hearers are actively focused, and (b) that because of this, those utterances typically presuppose

¹¹ Though I'm not sure what Kripke would say about this point, I don't take myself to be disagreeing with his basic position. He touches on the point in note 25, page 382, where he discusses the example, 'If someone voted against his tenure, then it is Susan who voted against his tenure'. In considering the pre-Kripke view that the consequent presupposes the antecedent, he says, "Since it [the presupposition that someone voted against his tenure] is filtered out in the conditionals (or conjunctions), it might seem to follow that the antecedent must state *the entire* presupposition required. Such filtering arguments, however, are never correct." (my emphasis) Kripke is right that such cases don't show that the antecedent expresses the *entire presupposition* of the consequent. In addition, he notes, "the antecedent raises the question, 'If so, who voted against his tenure?', which requires a complete answer."

¹² Since Kripke doesn't discuss negations of clefts, his verdict on this issue isn't clear.

the very propositions identified by the now discredited pre-Kripkean theory (often among other things). If this is right, then the central problem with that theory, so far as clefts are concerned, was not that it wrongly identified certain propositions as presupposed, but that it was blind to the fact that some presuppositional requirements are not matters of taking *propositions* for granted at all.¹³

These conclusions bring another in train; in certain cases the presuppositions associated with a cleft are cancelable, as illustrated by the following dialog:

A: Bill was wondering whether anyone had solved the problem, and if so, whether it was Susan who had done so. Do you know anything about that?

B: I'm sure it wasn't Susan, but I'm not sure anyone solved it.

Here, A's report puts the question into the active context that is required by B's use of the cleft sentence in response. But for the second conjunct, B's initial utterance would suggest that A was taking it for granted that someone had solved the problem. The point of that conjunct is to cancel this suggestion. Such cancelability is a feature of many utterance presuppositions not entailed by the propositions they express. What isn't cancelable is the presuppositional requirement that an utterance of (17a) or (17b) is understood as a response to the question (17d).

'Too' and 'Again' Again

Can we give a similar argument for 'too' sentences? Just as the standard, pre-Kripke analysis, characterized utterances of (17a) as presupposing the proposition expressed by (17c), so it characterized utterances of (18a) as presupposing the propositions expressed by (18c).

- 18a. A Ved too
- b. A didn't V too
- c. Someone other than A Ved.

With clefts, it was suggested that the presupposition was genuine, and not threatened by Kripke's critique -- which was taken to show that the usual presupposition of (17c) arises from a more

¹³ This is briefly discussed in Soames (1989). See pp. 127-128 of the reprinted version Soames (2009).

fundamental presupposition of a different sort, not contemplated by the previous theory. Can the same be said of ‘too’ sentences? On Kripke’s analysis, utterances of (18a) presuppose that the active context contains a parallel proposition characterizing someone other than A (or some group not containing A) as Ving. But if this is the basic presupposition of those utterances, it would seem that (18c) should itself qualify as an auxiliary presupposition.¹⁴

So far, I have said nothing about negations of ‘too’ sentences, which played a substantial role in the argument involving clefts. Since the interaction of ‘too’ with negation is complicated, the facts aren’t entirely straightforward. Nevertheless, there is, I think, a good sense in which ‘too’ obeys the rule that presuppositions are preserved under negation. Consider a discourse in which B’s remark is anaphorically dependent on the proposition expressed by A’s earlier remark.

19. A: The deans criticized the President.
B: *The professors* criticized *him* too

The propositions expressed by A and B are the same, save for the different contributions of ‘the deans’ and ‘the professors’. The resulting Kripkean presupposition of B’s utterance is that the professors aren’t the deans, which, it seems, brings with it the subsidiary presupposition that someone other than the deans criticized the President. To test whether negation preserves these presuppositions we negate B’s remark (and add ‘but’ for contrast).

20. A: The deans criticized the President.
B: But *the professors* didn’t criticize him too

Although B’s remark may, at first, sound a little awkward, there is, I think, a way of understanding it as negating ‘*the professors* criticized him too’, in which the presuppositions of that clause are preserved. On this reading, (20B) is equivalent to (21B), which, like (19B),

¹⁴Although Kripke’s discussion of (44) -- ‘If someone other than Harry volunteers, *Harry* will volunteer, too’ -- on page 382 seems to reject the idea that (18a) presupposes (18c), I understand his argument in the manner indicated in my previous footnote. What it shows is not that (18c) isn’t presupposed, but that this presupposition is a byproduct of the more fundamental anaphoric requirement that the clause containing ‘too’ is dependent on a piece of parallel information characterizing someone who is presupposed to be other than Harry as volunteering.

presupposes both that the professors are not the deans, and that someone other than the professors criticized the President.¹⁵

21. A: The deans criticized the President.
B: But it's not the case that *the professors* criticized him too

If this is right, then negations (18b), of 'too' sentences (18a), inherit the presuppositions of their positive counterparts – including the proposition expressed by (18c).

Parallel arguments can be constructed to support the conclusion that the presuppositions of 'again' sentences are preserved under negation, and that utterances of (22a) and (22b) standardly presuppose the proposition expressed by (22c), among other things.

- 22a. A Ved again.
b. A didn't V again.
c. A Ved before.

As with clefts and 'too'-sentences, the standard presupposition assigned to (a) and (b) by the theories Kripke criticizes were the propositions expressed by (c). As in the previous cases, what Kripke's arguments show is not that these propositions aren't typically presupposed by the relevant utterances, but (i) that certain other propositions are also presupposed, and (ii) the presupposition of the propositions expressed by (c) is a reflex of a special, and more fundamental, presuppositional requirement involving Kripke's notion of anaphoric dependence.

How strong are Kripke's 'too' presuppositions?

Kripke doesn't address the issue of whether the propositions presupposed by utterances of sentences containing 'too' or 'either' are part of their assertive contents (or truth conditions). But it's easy to see that they aren't. Consider an inquiry into the facts common to Hesperus and Phosphorus undertaken with the goal of determining how alike the two heavenly bodies may be,

¹⁵ This reading of (20B) must be distinguished from a second potential analysis in which it results from adding 'too' to 'the professors *didn't* criticize the President'. On this analysis, the parallel information required is that the deans *didn't* criticize the President. However, anaphoric dependence on this negative proposition would call for 'either' rather than 'too', resulting in '*The professors didn't* criticize him, either', rather than (20B).

and even whether or not they are identical. Since an utterance of (23) in such a situation would assert something true, and nothing false, the predicted Kripkean presupposition (23P) is not part of its assertive content (or truth conditions).

23. The heavenly body, Hesperus, that is seen in the evening is a planet, and *the heavenly body, Phosphorus, that is seen in the morning* is too.

23P. Hesperus \neq Phosphorus

In fact, the utterance doesn't seem to presuppose (23P) at all. With (24), the point is even clearer.

24. Although not many people know it, the heavenly body, Hesperus, that is seen in the evening is identical with the planet Venus, and *the heavenly body, Phosphorus, that is seen in the morning* is too.

24P. Hesperus \neq Phosphorus

Here, what the speaker asserts is incompatible with the nonidentity presupposition assigned by Kripke's analysis. Nevertheless, the utterance is perfectly coherent, since it doesn't carry the predicted presupposition.

This suggests one or the other of two things. Either, the anaphoric presuppositional requirements arising from 'too' are conversationally canceled in these cases, or the requirements given in (25), which I have reconstructed from Kripke's remarks, are too strong.

25. Anaphoric 'Too' Presuppositions

An utterance of a sentence, or clause, S containing 'too' requires (i) that there be one or more propositions $q_1 \dots q_n$ on which speaker-hearers are actively focused that *parallel* p except for containing one or more constituents ("the antecedents") that differ from the corresponding focused constituent of p ("the anaphor"), (ii) that because of this difference, p *adds* to the information in the context provided by the q s, and (iii) that when (by virtue of being parallel) both p and the q s characterize certain things as being so-and-so, the class of things so characterized by p and the q s together (plus, perhaps, other propositions mutually available in the context) *extends* the class of things so characterized by the q s alone (plus the same background propositions).

Clause (iii) specifies the strength of the requirement that p *adds new information* to the conversation. If it is correct, then it's not enough for p not to be entailed by the q s (plus, perhaps, other background propositions), or even for p not to be entailed by all that information plus whatever else hearers might already know. To opt for the former requirement would be to

understand the utterances of (23) and (24) as presupposing that it is *not* already taken for granted in the conversation that the heavenly body, Hesperus, that is seen in the evening is the heavenly body, Phosphorus, that is seen in the morning – which it isn't. To opt for the latter requirement would be to strengthen this slightly by adding that one's hearers *don't* already know the identity - - which, in the conversations cited, they don't. If the presuppositional requirements triggered by 'too' are understood in either of these relativity weak ways, then they will be satisfied both by Kripke's examples, and by utterances of (23) and (24). However, if (iii) is retained, (25) can be saved only if utterances of (23) and (24) can be viewed as cases in which the normal presuppositional requirements triggered by 'too' are cancelled.

With (24), such cancellation might be attributed to the inconsistency of the nonidentity presupposition with the speaker's assertion. A different explanation is needed for (23), which is uttered in a conversation aimed at discovering whether or not the identity holds. Similarly, a speaker, convinced of the *nonidentity* of Hesperus and Phosphorus, despite mounting evidence to the contrary, might use (26) to pursue the case.

26. I grant the similarities already mentioned, to which I add another. The planet, Hesperus, seen in the evening is smaller and hotter than the Earth, and *the planet, Phosphorus, seen in the morning* is too. However, other facts show that they are different.

If the 'too'-sentence in (26) carries Kripke's nonidentity presupposition, cancellation must occur, even though the speaker *endorses* that proposition. What makes it at least potentially possible for the cancellation strategy to cover all three cases is that, in each case the remark occurs in a conversation the aim of which is to establish whether or not the identity holds – which means that the speaker can't be *taking the nonidentity for granted*.

Still, it must be noted that even if cancellation of Kripke's presuppositions is the right strategy for these cases, such cancellation is limited to clause (iii) of (25), leaving in tact the

presuppositional requirements of clauses (i) and (ii), which, along with a weaker version (iii') of (iii), can, it would seem, never be cancelled.

(iii') that p is not entailed by the qs (plus, perhaps, other propositions mutually available in the context), or even by all that information plus whatever else the hearers already know.

This suggests a second possible strategy for dealing with (23), (24), and (26) – namely, weakening the presuppositional requirements triggered 'too' by substituting (iii') for (iii), thereby replacing (25) with (27).

27. Anaphoric 'Too' Presuppositions

An utterance of a sentence, or clause, S containing 'too' requires (i) that there be one or more propositions $q_1 \dots q_n$ on which speaker-hearers are actively focused that *parallel* p except for containing one or more constituents ("the antecedents") that differ from the corresponding focused constituent of p ("the anaphor"), (ii) that because of this difference, p *adds* to the information in the context provided by the qs, and (iii) that p is not entailed by the qs (plus, perhaps, other propositions mutually available in the context), or even by all that information plus whatever else the hearers already know.

On this approach, the task is to show why many (but not all) utterances of 'too'-sentences carry the stronger presuppositions identified by Kripke.

The strategy for doing so can be illustrated by applying it to Kripke's example (1).

1. If Herb comes, then *the boss* will come too.

We reason as follows: If both speaker and hearer know (and know that they know) that Herb *is* the boss, then (1) won't be used, since doing so would violate (27). By contrast, if both know (and know that they know) that Herb *isn't* the boss, then uttering (1) will do nothing to change the already recognized fact that it is presupposed that Herb isn't the boss. Next imagine a speaker s who knows that Herb *is* the boss, but doesn't know whether the hearer h also knows this. Since uttering (1) would risk puzzling, or provoking an objection from, h (who may, as far as s knows, also turn out to know that Herb is the boss), s is unlikely to utter (1) in this context – assuming that it isn't one, like those provided for (23), (23), and (26), in which the sentence is used as part of an attempt to establish, or refute, the identity. By contrast, if the speaker knows

that Herb *isn't* the boss, then there will be no such danger. So, if one hears an utterance of (1) in a conversation in which (a) the aim is *not* to establish the identity, or distinctness, of Herb and the boss, and (b) it may further be presumed that the speaker knows whether or not Herb is the boss, then one may reasonably conclude that the speaker knows or believes that Herb *isn't* the boss. In these cases, Kripke's claim that the utterance presupposes that Herb isn't the boss is correct, even though this presupposition isn't generated by presuppositional requirements of 'too'-sentences by themselves. Rather it arises from the combination of these requirements, given by (25), with other features of the context. When these contextual features are absent – as they were in the scenarios involving (23), (24), and (26) – Kripke's nonidentity (and non-inclusion) presuppositions are not carried by utterances of 'too' sentences, though the presuppositions arising directly from (27) are.

To sum up, although utterances of 'too' sentences are always anaphorically dependent on parallel information in the active context, sometimes this dependence gives rise to Kripke's non-identity, or non-inclusion, presuppositions, and sometimes it doesn't. There are two possible explanations for this. One retains the full content of those presuppositions, but treats them as defeasible, and subject to conversational cancellation. The other assigns weakened, non-defeasible presuppositional contents, which combine with other features of the context to give rise to fully-fledged, nonidentity and non-inclusion presuppositions in many, but not all, cases. I leave it open which of these potential explanations is correct.

Conditions Governing Presuppositional Anaphora in Complex Sentences

Kripke's article closes with an important, though perplexing, set of examples.

- 28a. If Haldeman is guilty, then *Nixon* is guilty too
- b. *Nixon* is guilty too, if Haldeman is.
- c. *If *Haldeman* is guilty too, then Nixon is.
- d. Nixon is guilty, if *Haldeman* is guilty too.

The proposition expressed by the antecedent of (28a) is the parallel information required by ‘too’ in the consequent. The same is true of (28b), which preserves the presuppositional requirements of (28a), despite inverting the order of antecedent and consequent. This isn’t surprising, since one would expect both (i) that inverting this order wouldn’t affect either the propositions expressed by, or the conventional implicatures of, the corresponding conditionals, and (ii) that the only Gricean conversational implicatures that might differentiate the two are those arising not from what is said, but only from the manner in which it is said – which one might not expect to make a difference here. However, the contrast between (28c*) and (28d) indicates that something more is at work. It is no surprise that an utterance of the former requires the active context prior to the remark to contain a proposition predicating guilt of someone potentially other than Haldeman. The surprise is that an utterance of (28d) doesn’t require this, since inverting antecedent and consequent allows the proposition expressed by the latter to play this role.¹⁶

Since the examples are so similar semantically, it is natural to speculate that presuppositional ‘too’-anaphora is sensitive to syntactic constraints, over and above semantic, or independently motivated pragmatic, factors – just as pronominal anaphora is. This is the point of Kripke’s comparison of the pattern in (28) with that in (29).

- 29a. If *John* is free, *he* will come to the party.
- b.* *He* will come to the party, if *John* is free.
- c. If *he* is free, *John* will come to the party.
- d. *John* will come to the party, if *he* is free.

Italics are used to indicate anaphora, while ‘*’ signifies that the anaphoric reading so indicated is not possible. Kripke notes that the structural conditions governing presuppositional ‘too’ anaphora are different from those governing pronominal anaphora. His call for research to

¹⁶ This is a point about which Kripke changed his mind, not recognizing it in his (1990) talk and circulated draft.

determine “the rules of anaphora for presuppositions, analogously to those for pronominalization?” (p. 385) is, of course, unexceptionable.

Nevertheless, it is possible to make too much of the analogy. Unlike pronominal anaphora, which must be determined before we know what propositions are expressed or asserted, to understand Kripke’s presuppositional anaphora is to understand how different propositions, or other contents in a discourse, relate to one another. Pronominal anaphors and antecedents are expressions that must stand in a certain structural relationship in order for the antecedent to play its role in interpreting the anaphor, while presuppositional “anaphors” and “antecedents” are non-linguistic constituents of propositions, which, of course, don’t require interpretation. Because of this, we shouldn’t expect the conditions governing presuppositional anaphora to be the same as those governing familiar forms of linguistic anaphora.

The most immediate difficulty for Kripke’s theory posed by (28) is its threat to the Karttunen-Peters inheritance conditions for the presuppositions of indicative conditionals, which he (tentatively) assumes. Stated in terms of the propositions presupposed by utterances, they are given by (30a); stated in terms of the conversational contexts that satisfy the presuppositional requirements of utterances, they are given by the more encompassing, (30b).¹⁷

30a. $(\text{If } A, \text{ then } B)^P = (A^P \ \& \ (A^T \supset B^P))$

- b. A context X satisfies the presuppositional requirements of (if A, then B) iff
 - (i) X satisfies the presuppositional requirements of A, and
 - (ii) $X \cup \{A\}$ satisfies the presuppositional requirements of B

¹⁷ See Soames (1979), reprinted in Soames (2009), at pp. 32-37 of the reprinted version, for a discussion of the relationships between different ways of formulating the Karttunen and Peters inheritance conditions. The notation in (30) may be understood as follows: ‘A’ and ‘B’ are metalinguistic variables that range over English sentences. ‘P’ denotes a function that assigns to each English sentence a metalanguage expression that is equivalent to the conjunction of its presuppositions (a maximal presupposition). When a sentence carries no presuppositions this function assigns it a tautology. ‘T’ denotes a function that assigns each English sentence a metalanguage expression that represents its truth conditions. ‘ \supset ’ denotes a function from pairs of metalanguage formulas to metalanguage formulas. Similarly for ‘if, then’ except that the domain and range of the function it denotes consist of English sentences. ‘U’ in (30b) denotes a function that maps a pair of sets onto their union.

When (30) is coupled with (31), which is normally taken for granted, (28d) is a potential counter-example to the combination of the inheritance conditions with Kripke's analysis of the presuppositional requirements of 'too'-sentences.

31. The presuppositions (presuppositional requirements) of (If A, then B) = those of (B, if A).
What the contrast between (28c) and (28d) shows is that the proposition expressed by the consequent of a conditional can serve as the piece of "anaphoric information" on which an occurrence of 'too' in the antecedent depends when, and only when, the consequent precedes the conditional. Since ordinary, non-anaphoric, presuppositions do not show a corresponding contrast, Kripke's phenomena can't be captured by simply combining his analysis with any analysis of the presuppositional requirements of conditionals which, like that of Karttunen and Peters, is designed solely with non-anaphoric presuppositional requirements in mind.

Although Kripke doesn't explicitly address how to handle this difficulty, his overall approach has the resources for a positive response. As I have stressed, that approach brings with it an important change in the conversational contexts required by theories of the presuppositions of utterances. Whereas the conception of context employed by the inheritance condition (30b) has traditionally been understood to be simply the set of propositions already accepted in the conversation, the extension of such theories to cover Kripke-style presuppositional anaphora requires the further specification of an active context, on which speaker-hearers are focused. When one incorporates this idea into older accounts of presupposition inheritance it is crucial to separate two questions: (i) Where in "the context" can one look for parallel information on which utterances of sentences, or clauses, containing 'too' anaphorically depend?, and (ii) What parts of "the context" are involved in computing the presuppositions of utterances of complex sentences containing 'too'-clauses, once anaphoric dependencies have been found, and presuppositional requirements have been assigned to those clauses?

The point of the separation is to allow the domains that answer these questions to differ. The surprising fact to be learned from the contrast between (28c) and (28d) is that sometimes the active context -- which is the domain relevant for answering (i) -- is *not a proper subset* of the class of propositions needed to compute the presuppositions of utterances of compound sentences from the presuppositional requirements of their constituent clauses -- which is the domain for answering (ii). Once this is recognized, one is free to adopt the inheritance condition (30), in either form, for both [If A, then B] and [B, if A], while retaining (31). On this approach, the role of (30) and (31) is to identify the presuppositional requirements that utterances of conditionals place on the background propositions in domain (ii), *after the presuppositions of their constituent clauses have been assigned, including those that arise from anaphoric dependencies on the contents of domain (i)*. On this view, the linear order of antecedent and consequent affects the presuppositions assigned to utterances of the antecedent, while having no further effect on the presuppositions of the utterance of the conditional as a whole.

Understood in this way, Kripke can combine his account of presuppositional anaphora with the Karttunen and Peters inheritance conditions for conjunctions, disjunctions, and conditionals. But do those conditions do any real work for him? Kripke argues that they do, using (32) to motivate his claim that when the consequent of a conditional contains ‘too’, the nonidentity, or non-inclusion, presuppositions to which it gives rise are attached to the consequent itself, rather than to the conditional as a whole.

32. If Nancy does not win the contest and the winner comes to our party, *Nancy* will come too.

Kripke contrasts an utterance of (32), which doesn’t presuppose that Nancy won’t win, with an utterance of (1), which does presuppose that Herb isn’t the boss. According to (30), utterances of these sentences presuppose (32P) and (1P), respectively.

32P. Nancy does not win the contest and the winner comes to our party \supset Nancy \neq the winner

1P. Herb comes \supset Herb \neq the boss

Since the antecedent of (30P) entails its consequent, the presupposition of the consequent of (30) is “filtered out,” and is not carried by an utterance of (32). By contrast, if (1) is uttered in a context in which Herb’s coming wouldn’t provide evidence that he isn’t the boss, the speaker -- who can’t be taking it for granted that the antecedent of (1) and (1P) is false -- will naturally be taken to presuppose the consequent of (1P). The analysis applies equally to (33).¹⁸

33. Nancy will come too, if she does not win the contest and the winner comes to our party.

Next consider what happens when ‘too’ is moved from the consequent of (33) to the antecedent.

34. Nancy will come to our party, if Nancy does not win the contest and *the winner* comes too. Again, an utterance of the conditional does not presuppose that Nancy won’t win, despite the fact that, on Kripke’s analysis, the second conjunct of the antecedent, does. Again, the absence of the utterance presupposition can, in principle, be explained by a Karttunen and Peters inheritance condition – this time the condition (35) for conjunctions.

35a. $(A \text{ and } B)^P = (A^P \ \& \ (A^T \supset B^P))$

- b. A context X satisfies the presuppositional requirements of (A and B) iff
- (i) X satisfies the presuppositional requirements of A, and
 - (ii) X U {A} satisfies the presuppositional requirements of B

According to (35), the antecedent of (34) presupposes the trivial (34P), which, given (30), is passed on as a presupposition of the entire conditional.

34P. Nancy doesn’t win the contest \supset Nancy \neq the winner

¹⁸ Here is how Kripke makes the argument. “In discussing [1], I identified the presupposition that Herb is not the boss. Should this presupposition be attached to the consequent clause...or should it be attached to the whole conditional, as we would intuitively think in many of these cases? If we attach it merely to the consequent clause, then we have to invoke the type of explanation given by Karttunen and Peters for why it is that we intuitively think something stronger. I do indeed favor attaching it to the consequent clause. The need for this is seen from example [32]. The presupposition...is that Nancy will not be the winner. According to Karttunen and Peters, if the presupposition is attached to the consequent, it is “filtered out” and need not be presupposed by the speaker who utters the entire conditional. This result seems to me to be intuitively correct.” p. 375.

Since this trivial presupposition provides no basis for taking the utterance to presuppose that Nancy won't win the contest, the presupposition that Nancy won't be the winner is "filtered out."

However, things change when we invert the order of conjuncts in the antecedent.

36. Nancy will come to our party, if *the winner* comes too and Nancy herself doesn't win.

Although an utterance of (36) no more presupposes that Nancy won't win than utterances of (32), (33), or (34) do, this is *not* predicted by the Karttunen and Peters inheritance conditions. Rather, (35) will transmit this presupposition from the first conjunct of the antecedent of (36) to the antecedent itself, which (30) will assign to the conditional as a whole. Thus the combination of Kripke's account of the presuppositions carried by 'too'-clauses, together with his use of the Karttunen and Peters inheritance conditions, incorrectly predict that utterances of (36) presuppose that Nancy won't win the context.

Rather, this incorrect prediction is forthcoming. if one assumes, with Karttunen and Peters, that presuppositions aren't conversationally cancelable. Since Kripke says nothing about this assumption, he is free to reject it. If he does, then the fact that utterances of (36) don't presuppose that Nancy won't win can be attributed to the fact that such a presupposition would render one conjunct of the antecedent superfluous. Since a speaker who includes the conjunct conversationally implicates that he is *not* presupposing it, the presupposition is cancelled. Although this saves Kripke from a counterexample, however, it also deprives him of the only argument he gives – based on (32) -- for incorporating the Karttunen and Peters inheritance conditions into his account in the first place. Since the canceling-explanation needed for (36) applies equally to (32), (33) and (34), those examples don't show that the presuppositions of utterances of compound sentences 'too' are given by the Karttunen and Peters conditions.¹⁹

¹⁹ For more on the issues raised in this paragraph, see pp. 54-63 of the reprinting of Soames (1979) in Soames (2009).

Fortunately, this problem is essentially one of omission, and does not, I think, undermine the essential correctness of Kripke's analysis. In Soames (1982), it was argued that even when conversational canceling of presuppositions is allowed, there is still need for something like the Karttunen and Peters conditions for conjunctions, disjunctions, and indicative conditionals. The situation is complicated by the fact that some of those arguments can't be accepted as they stand, since they assumed an incorrect analyses of the presuppositions triggered clefts, 'too', and 'again', which Kripke has shown to be anaphoric in his special sense. However, other arguments given there for the same conclusion are not infected by this problem, and so continue to suggest that something akin to the Karttunen and Peters conditions plays a role in theories of presupposition.²⁰ If this is right, then there is nothing inherently wrong with appealing to them in the computation of the presuppositions of utterances of compound sentences containing Kripke's anaphoric presupposition triggers.

Nevertheless a word of caution is in order. The interaction between the conversational canceling of utterance presuppositions and Karttunen-Peters type filtering of constituent presuppositions of compound sentences is complicated, and fraught with difficulties.²¹ I no longer believe that my own previous attempt to provide a synthesis of the two works, nor do I know of any other approach that is descriptively adequate.²² The good news is that this doesn't cast significant doubt on Kripke's achievement, which is not diminished, even if the overall theory of presupposition into which it must ultimately fit remains far from settled.

²⁰ See pp. 496-499 of Soames (1982)

²¹ See pp. 502-516 of Soames (1982) for details.

²²For some indication why, see Soames (1989), reprinted in Soames (2009).

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